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Reflective Essay 
This past fall semester, my Security Studies class engaged me to explore some of the most 
pivotal security issues in our society. The prompt of our final essay asked us to reflect on what is 
the most serious security threat facing the international community today, and what would need 
to happen to resolve or counter the threat, and what obstacles exist to such a solution. In my 
answer, I wanted to convey my sense that the dynamics that emerge in diplomacy can parallel 
those in human psychology. This mindset could enable us to understand state behavior in a new 
light, and ultimately lead to a fundamentally different approach to security policy. I decided to 
examine concepts related to estrangement and alienation in my essay “Diplomacy of Alienation 
as a Fundamental Threat to International Security: The Case Study of Iran,” and focus on the 
case study of Iran to illustrate the dynamics that isolating policies can create. According to my 
thesis, the diplomacy of alienation leads to a self-fulfilling feedback loop that accumulates 
insecurity and conflict in the international community, and ultimately constitutes the most 
significant security threat of our time. 
Initially, I started building my theoretical framework based on the scholarship of Randall 
Schweller, and particularly his paper “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State 
Back In.”1 As I continued my research under the guidance of Professor Jennifer Taw, I noticed 
that relying purely on Schweller’s neoclassical realism and the concepts of balancing and 
bandwagoning would not allow me to sufficiently explain the behavior of alienated states, nor the 
responses from the international community. This forced me to fundamentally reconsider the 
theoretical base that I had been constructing.  
Under these circumstances, I expanded my use of different research resources and looked 
for alternative scholarly viewpoints, including those outside international relations and political 
science. I used online search and the Claremont Library database extensively to look for 
academics whose scholarship I could apply to my research question. I was able to find, study, and 
partially also utilize scholarship in anthropology, psychology, and history, for example, as I tried 
to bring more depth to my analysis of Iran’s internal political dialogue. With the sources that 
                                                
1 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, No. 1 
(Summer 1994): 72-107. 
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were from the field of my own paper, I put a lot of time into translating the insights into the 
terminology and viewpoint of international relations and thinking about their relevance and 
applicability. Considering the contentiousness of Iranian politics as a topic, I was very rigorous 
with my sources and put a lot of emphasis into analyzing the potential political motivations of 
the writers. This was a particular challenge with online sources, which also made me understand 
the importance and validity that using library databases brings. Overall, these amplified efforts 
led me to find unique perspectives and engage with my research question more creatively.  
I also decided to expand my theoretical approach into other frameworks within the realist 
paradigm, and my research ultimately led me to Charles Glaser’s book Rational Theory of 
International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation, which proved to be an 
expansive resource for my essay.2 The book, as well as many others that I was using, is available 
online through the Claremont Colleges database. This online access significantly enhanced my 
research capabilities, as I was able to browse the book right away and evaluate quickly my interest 
in as a resource. I decided to incorporate Professor Glaser’s classification scheme of states – 
between security-seeking and revisionist states – into my paper. I also had prompt access to his 
other scholarly work, which inspired me to shift the focus of my argument into the theory of 
security dilemmas. As I started to combine these different approaches within realism, Professor 
Taw’s critical questions directed me to ultimately form a multi-dimensional explanatory model 
into the implications of alienating diplomacy and the possible policy solutions to counter them. 
Throughout this process, an important resource was also the discussions I had with my peer 
students in the class. Hearing their contending perspectives and alternative explanations 
challenged me to question the strength of my arguments and develop my reasoning further. 
The research paper allowed me to significantly deepen my understanding of the 
theoretical paradigms in international relations, apply them into a fascinating current case study, 
and evaluate different policy options based on my analysis. This process enabled me to break 
down the various theories into their component parts, and recombine them in a novel way to 
support my own argument. Going through multiple rounds of research, writing, and revision 
                                                
2 Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
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enabled me to understand the adaptability and transformability of international relations theory, 
and my own active agency in constructing it. This insight also strengthened my goal of pursuing 
a future career in academia, which had started to interest me during my sophomore year. This 
research project allowed me to prove myself how much I enjoyed the process and intellectual 
challenge of academic research, and how inspiring it would be to do this professionally. Most 
importantly, the project enabled me to connect the theoretical world into reality. I fundamentally 
modified my own perceptions of Iran as a country, and the factors that drive its internal decision-
making processes. This made me understand the potentially transformative nature of academic 
research, but also the challenging barriers that exist between theory and practice. This disconnect 
between the spheres of academia and the real world interests me tremendously, as its 
implications are very visible in international affairs today. Unlocking this challenging divide 
could transform the way we think about security in the real world, which is also inspiring me to 
continue examining this question in my future scholarship.  
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Diplomacy of Alienation as a Fundamental Threat to International Security: 
The Case Study of Iran 
Introduction 
The most severe security threat facing the international community relates to the policy of 
alienating diplomacy and its implications – the destabilizing strategies employed by states that have 
become misperceived as revisionist, the counterstrategies adopted by other states as a response to 
these radical approaches, and the potential for stability that is lost through the isolating policies. 
Diplomacy of alienation is deeply ingrained in systemic-level great power competition, and creates a 
situation that limits states’ interactions with each other, which can lead to mutual misinterpretation 
of state motives. It also limits the alienated states’ foreign policy choices, constraining their ability to 
demonstrate their true intentions through legitimate mechanisms and leading them to adopt radical 
and extreme foreign policy approaches. This reinforces and legitimizes the perception of these states 
as rogue and revisionists within the international community. As a result, the international 
community adopts counterstrategies that only increase the destabilizing effects to international 
security and further make the alienated states feel insecure. This constitutes a self-fulfilling feedback 
loop based on a security dilemma, which accumulates insecurity and conflict in the international 
community, and also has negative implications due to lost potential stability. Iran is analyzed as a 
country that has gone through these dynamics, but that has also demonstrated progress as a result of 
reversed alienation and reengagement efforts from the international community.  
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Theoretical Framework 
 According to the family of theories that fall under the realist paradigm, the international 
system is characterized by anarchy, implying that there is no international authority that can enforce 
state action or limit the use of force.1 The system is based on self-help, where states rely on their 
own capabilities in achieving their security and global objectives. Due to this, power is seen as the 
key consideration for states, comprising wealth, population, technological sophistication, and other 
factors that enable states to strengthen their security, mainly through military capabilities. 
 As states form together the international community, there is also a broader context of 
security that relates to the stability of the global order and the coherence of the international system. 
In its current form, it is based on the Westphalian system and liberal hegemonic order that values 
sovereignty, consent, and noninterference with the internal affairs of other states.2 Just as individual 
states face threats originating from a variety of levels, so does the international community. Threats 
to international security are defined as factors that have the capability and intent to disrupt the 
international order, decrease the legitimacy of agreed norms, and otherwise harm the effective 
functioning of the international system on a multinational level.3 The referent object, or the entity 
that is being threatened, can be the international order itself, or the fundamental concepts that hold 
it together, such as sovereignty or territorial integrity.  
Different strands of realism have contrasting views on the main factors that motivate state 
behavior. In the neoclassical realist framework, security-seeking states are defined as entities that 
                                                
1 Alan Collins, Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 13. 
2 John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011). 
3 Liz St. Jean, “The Changing Nature of “International Security: The Need for an Integrated Definition,” Norman Paterson 
School of International Affairs, Carleton University, http://www.iusafs.org/pdf/stjean.pdf. 
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prioritize sovereignty and security and consider power as a means, rather than as an end, as it 
enables them to achieve a strong and stable position in the international community. The 
framework, however, also defines revisionist states that are driven by the elemental forces of power 
and expansion and aim to “increase, not just preserve, their core values and to improve their 
position in the system.”4 Security-seeking states will be content with a cooperative and secure status 
quo, since they are already “kings of the hill,” even if this prevents them from gaining further 
territory. Revisionist states, on the other hand, are motivated to pursue improvements in their 
relative position in the system through competition and confrontational policies.5 This division 
between states is also the basis for the difference between defensive and offensive realism, 
respectively, and the two theories’ contrasting perceptions of the main factors driving state behavior.  
Despite the state of the world as a self-help system,  cooperative interactions are still 
possible within the realist framework as a means to attain security.6 Variables that make cooperation 
between states possible include the permanence of the states’ relationship, the mutual gains that only 
cooperation creates, the increased costs of noncooperation, and the confidence-building measures 
that increase the expectation of the other sides’ cooperation.7 The key threat is the possibility of the 
other actors’ defection, so all of these factors lead to circumstances where deception becomes a less 
optimal strategy. If a state considers the partner to be motivated by power, rather than just security, 
it won’t trust it to cooperate and will thus adopt a confrontational approach itself.8 This will lead to a 
                                                
4 Randall Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19, No. 1 
(Summer 1994): 72-107. 
5 Charles Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
6 Joseph Parent and Sebastian Rosato, “Balancing in Neorealism,” International Security 40, No. 2 (Fall 2015): 51-86. 
7 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, No. 2 (January 1978): 167-214. 
8 Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. 
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security dilemma, in which the means that a state uses to increase its security lead others to feel 
insecure and increase their capabilities, leading the first state to find itself in a worse position.9  
In neoclassical realism, informational variables about state motives, and status as security-
seeking or power-seeking state, are seen as the key factors behind the decision to collaborate. An 
individual state can decide to collaborate instead of unilaterally pursue power, but only if “both 
states are sure that the opposing state is a security seeker (and if both also know that the other 
knows this).”10 This emphasizes the role of interaction and signaling in defining state-to-state 
relations, as “the information that states have at the beginning of their interaction can determine the 
future path of their political relationship.”11 A correct perception of the partner states’ motives and 
status as a security seeker or power-seeker enables states to have rational expectations about the 
counterpart’s responsive behavior and make informed choices on their foreign policy approaches, 
leading them to adopt optimal strategies. 
The nature of states as security-seeking or power-seeking, as well as their relative power 
status in the international system, determines their foreign policy interactions. Revisionist states are 
always going to be seen as a threat by states that are security-oriented, but the states’ relationship 
depends on whether the revisionist state is a great power or close to one, or whether it is a weaker 
power that aims to achieve a higher power position and is also willing to use asymmetrical and 
unconventional strategies in the process. In the former case, security-seeking states can use external 
balancing to counterweight the revisionist state to increase their own security.12 But when the 
revisionist state cannot yet significantly influence the balance of power in the international system, 
security-seeking states won’t balance against it. The smaller revisionist state might also not pose 
                                                
9 Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 167-214. 
10 Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. 
11 Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. 
12	Collins, Contemporary Security Studies.	
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significant enough a threat that to justify a military attack, even if it is utilizing radical and 
destabilizing foreign policy strategies. 
With revisionist states, other traditional foreign policy approaches are also not considered 
viable options. First, the ability to bandwagon with these states is limited due to lack of trust and 
imbalance in the states’ prioritization of security and power interests. Furthermore, bandwagoning 
can be considered to constitute a form of appeasement and includes unequal exchange where the 
weaker state makes “asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate 
role.”13 But by their nature, revisionist states will not accept this position, as it limits their ability to 
pursue a higher power position, even if it provided more security. Thus, in this situation, the 
security-seeking status quo states seek to alienate the less powerful revisionist states from the 
international system. 
Great powers that are power-seeking, however, can create collaborative interactions with the 
smaller revisionist states and use them as a balancing tool. In this scenario, the states that are 
alienated by security-seeking states are simultaneously propped up by those that are also power-
seeking. This essentially creates a dynamic equilibrium where the concurrent alienation and 
sustenance leads the smaller revisionist states to fall outside of the international system. They don’t 
have an incentive to change their relationships with either side, however, as mending relations with 
security-seeking great powers would risk making the supporter state feel threatened. On the other 
hand, the continued backing that the smaller states receive from the revisionist great powers makes 
security-seeking states unwilling to reconsider their relations with them.  
Diplomacy of alienation, whether initially self-imposed or enforced by other states, is 
maintained through its role as a balancing tool in great power competition. Its continuance, 
                                                
13 Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” 
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however, is also related to two other powerful mechanisms. First, alienation leads to limited 
interaction between states and decreases the availability of information, leading to the possibility of 
states’ false perceptions of each other’s motives. States can develop a mistaken notion of another 
state as power-seeking, or continue considering it as one despite a change in behavior and 
motivations. Secondarily, the isolated states become limited in their foreign policy options as a result 
of alienation, decreasing their ability to signal their intentions and motivations correctly. In the 
absence of a full spectrum of accepted foreign policy choices, the alienated states have a stronger 
tendency to adopt unconventional strategies that are seen as radical and threatening by the rest of 
the international community. As the other states are operating in a fog of uncertainty due to the lack 
of interaction, they often draw conclusions too rapidly about the intention of the actions of the 
alienated states and find reasons to reinforce their image of these states as revisionist.  
As states choose their foreign policy responses according to these false notions of the other 
state as greedy, these presumed motivations become self-fulfilling for the alienated state. When they 
are approached according to their misinterpreted status, they are forced to respond based on how a 
state with those motivations would – by adopting radical foreign policy strategies. This initiates a 
powerful feedback loop that is maintained by the continued lack of interaction, as the isolation 
disables new informational variables from influencing the states’ perception of each other and allows 
for continued misinterpretation of state motivations. The feedback loop represents a two-way causal 
relationship that can be initiated at any of its stages, with the reciprocal confrontational strategies 
and counterstrategies feeding it and forcing the alienated state to depend solely on itself in providing 
its security. Thus, the situation reflects a self-help system that is taken to the extreme.  
The dynamics that emerge in this situation pose the greatest threat the international 
community faces, as the resulting condition accumulates effects that threaten the stability of the 
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current international order. Especially given the strong bond that the feedback loop has on great 
power competition, these clustering effects can create a time bomb that can be set off by a 
disruption in the relative power dynamics between states. Even if this doesn’t happen, the 
accumulating effects themselves are deeply destabilizing to the international community. Alienation 
causes isolated states to adopt confrontational strategies that include engaging in state sponsorship 
of terrorism; developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs; pursuing highly 
advanced offensive capabilities; and adopting asymmetric tactics, including cyberattacks. As a 
counter-response to these, the international community often chooses actions that reinforce the 
negative consequences to international security and creates conditions where the alienated state lacks 
any incentive to respect international norms and act collaboratively. Alienation also leads to 
secondary effects within the alienated states that are threatening from the perspective of human 
security. These can include economic inequality; societal instability; and authoritarianism and 
oppression of the people as the state leadership prioritizes its foreign policy objectives and prevents 
the population from interfering with its strategies. 
In addition to these concrete destabilizing effects arising from the security dilemma, the 
situation is also a threat to international security due to the opportunity cost and lost potential 
stability from disabling the alienated states from acting as full members of the international 
community. They could contribute significantly more to international diplomacy, global trade, and 
other aspects of multinational affairs, but their misperceived status prevents them from being 
considered legitimate actors. The unrealized potential stability and security in international affairs is 
difficult to quantify, explaining why states don’t recognize the significance of this threat. 
Recent history has included a set of states that have experienced the dynamics of alienation 
at varying levels. Examples include Cuba, South Africa, North Korea, Burma, and Iran. Some of 
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these have isolated themselves as a consequence of domestic politics, such as Burma, while others 
have become isolated as a result of larger-scale dynamics, such as Cuba in the Cold War context. In 
the cases where the international community has started the alienation, there have been legitimate 
reasons to believe that the states’ motivations are incompatible with the status of the international 
system. This is the case for North Korea, based on its authoritarian regime and deeply military-
oriented foreign policy, and South Africa during the apartheid era.  
Iran is a clear example of country that has experienced the repetitive patterns of alienation 
and has responded with a confrontational foreign policy strategy after the country went through an 
Islamic revolution in 1979.14 Many countries perceive Iran as a radical revisionist state that doesn’t 
follow the norms of behavior in the international community, which has given them a reason to 
isolate the country. The United States has described its approach as a “general containment policy 
toward political and economic isolation.”15 It sees Iran as a rogue state with aims to establish itself as 
a regional hegemon, which would interfere with U.S. interests: “Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology, 
its obstruction of the Middle East peace process, its involvement in the Beirut attacks of the 1980s 
and the 1996 Khobar Towers (Saudi Arabia) bombing of an American troop residence, and 
providing lethal aid to violent non-state actors in Lebanon, Iraq, the Palestinian territories and 
Afghanistan are viewed by the United States as obstacles to rapprochement.”16  
Iran has responded to this approach as the feedback loop assumes, with a confrontational 
foreign policy that based on its notion that the United States is overreaching its influence in the 
region: “The United States is viewed by the Iranian government as a hostile, interventionist state 
attempting to topple the Iranian republic, indicated by the U.S. role in the 1953 coup d’état of the 
                                                
14 Edmund Herzig, “Regionalism, Iran and Central Asia,” International Affairs 80, No. 3 (2004): 503-517. 
15 Akan Malici and Allison Buckner, “Empathizing with Rogue Leaders: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Bashar al-Asad,” 
Journal of Peace Research 45, No. 6 (2008): 783-800. 
16 Mir Sadat and James Hughes, “U.S.-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy Council XVII, No. 1 
(Spring 2010). 
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legal Iranian government, vehement rejection of the Islamic Revolution, disregard for Saddam 
Hussein’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, the shooting down of an Iranian 
passenger plane, imposing economic sanctions, freezing of Iranian financial assets, resistance to 
Iranian nuclear progress for clean energy, and threats to invade or attack Iran.”17 This shows the 
mutual perceptions that Iran and the United States have of each other as greedy, which has led to 
the creation of a security dilemma that rationalizes confrontational foreign policies and makes the 
mutual perceptions to become self-fulfilled. 
Consequences of Alienation 
As outcasts, alienated countries lack the incentive to maintain a positive and cooperative 
reputation in the international community, as they will be considered revisionist in any case. The 
strategies adopted as a consequence of disenfranchisement can all be interpreted as offensive 
methods of projecting power and considered illegitimate in the current international system. The 
international community’s destabilizing confrontational responses lead to reinforced mutual 
misperceptions, which reflects how the dynamics of alienation lead to the self-fulfilling conditions.   
One way for alienated states to project power is to sponsor terrorist groups. The strategy 
contains the important aspect of force multiplication, which becomes increasingly important for 
states as their foreign policy options become more limited.18 Iran has used a variety of terrorist 
groups to project its power regionally and globally. It has been considered the most active state 
sponsor of terrorism during the past decades, with activity in providing arms, training, financing, 
planning and other assistance to Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), as well as other 
                                                
17 Sadat and Hughes, “U.S.-Iran Engagement Through Afghanistan.” 
18 Stephen Collins, “State-Sponsored Terrorism: In Decline, Yet Still a Potent Threat,” Politics & Policy 42, No. 1 (2014): 
131-159. 
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antigovernment militants.19 While the total Iranian support to many of these groups declined after 
the 9/11 attacks, in line with a global restraint in state sponsorship of terrorism that the events 
precipitated. After 2010, Iran has resumed a more active position in assisting terrorist groups, 
presumably as a reaction to assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, heightened threat of a 
military attack from Israel and the United States, and increased economic sanctions.20 The Quds 
Force, the Iranian military’s special operations division, has an essential role in using the terrorist 
sponsorship activities to achieve Iran’s strategic objectives.21  
Iran’s nuclear program is another example of its confrontational foreign policy. Iran is a 
party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has agreed to IAEA safeguards and surveillance since 
1974.22 It has developed civilian nuclear capabilities since the early 1970s through the Atoms for 
Peace program, but all outside help ended following the revolution in 1979.23 The events caused the 
country’s nuclear aspirations to halt before a revival in late 1980s as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq 
war.24 The country started further increasing its efforts to achieve nuclear capabilities in the 1990s, 
after which the initial accusations of weapons development emerged.25 In 2002, “IAEA has 
identified nuclear sites, equipment, and activities that, contrary to its obligations, Iran failed to report 
to the IAEA.”26 In 2007, intelligence from the United States assessed that the nuclear weapons 
development efforts had been discontinued, but new evidence in 2009 revealed that a second 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
20	Ibid.	
21 Anthony Cordesman, “Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the Al Quds Force, and Other Intelligence and Paramilitary 
Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 15, 2007. 
Collins, “State-Sponsored Terrorism: In Decline, Yet Still a Potent Threat,” 131-159. 
22	Greg Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Council for Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/iran/irans-
nuclear-program/p16811.	
23 Ibid. 
24 Shahram Chubin, “The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” United States Institute of Peace, 2010, last updated August 
2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program. 
25 Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”  
26 “Contemporary Practice of the U.S. Relating to International Law,” American Journal of International Law 99, pp. 253. 
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uranium enrichment facility had been built in Qom.27 The following year, an IAEA report further 
emphasized the suspicions of continued Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons.28 
The development of nuclear arms by Iran is motivated by its aim to create deterrent hedge 
against foreign attack and the nuclear capabilities that Israel possesses, which can both be seen as 
rational calculations. However, its drive towards achieving these capabilities is furthered by a sense 
that the international community aims to restrict its rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
suppress the country’s technological development, and alienate the country from the international 
community.29 This has provoked the country to feel a lack of legitimacy, respect, and dignity as a 
power player in the international community, and led the country to see the nuclear program as a 
strategic option for guaranteeing its security.30 The country’s nuclear program poses a severe 
international security threat also due to its potential to precipitate a regional nuclear arms race, as it 
makes the countries in the Middle East feel insecure and rationalize their need for creating matching 
programs.31   
Additionally, Iran has sophisticated capabilities in missile technology, developed in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war.32 Iran purchased the initial capabilities and production lines for 
ballistic missiles from North Korea, and has subsequently developed an indigenous missile 
program.33 In addition, it has started developing unmanned aerial vehicles modeled after Western 
designs, as well as space launch capabilities.34 Iran has also focused on gaining extensive capabilities 
                                                
27 Bruno, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.” 
28 Ibid. 
29 Chubin, “The Politics of Iran’s Nuclear Program.”  
30 Clifford Kupchan, “Iranian Beliefs and Realities,” The National Interest 81 (Fall 2005): 106. 
31 Nodir Ataev, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran,” Central European University, 
Department of Economics. 
32 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile: Iran,” last modified October, 2015, http://www.nti.org/country-
profiles/iran/. 
33 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile: Iran.” 
34 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Country Profile: Iran.” 
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in the cyber domain, which as an asymmetric field provides potential for strategic advantages.35 All 
of these sophisticated technologies indicate a continuing effort in Iran to enhance their offensive 
capabilities to attain security and ability to protect territorial sovereignty. Due to isolation, the state 
has been forced to adopt these radical approaches to pursue its security-seeking goals. 
As a response to Iran’s radical foreign policy strategies, particularly its nuclear and missile 
programs, the international community has established a sanctions regime against the country 
through the United Nations Security Council.36 Individual countries and regions have also 
established separate sanctions programs as a response to the proliferation threat, including the 
United States through additional unilateral sanctions. Iran has also become isolated from the 
international banking system, as banks are discouraged from “providing loans, export credits, and 
other financial services to Iran.”37 The Iranian sponsorship of terrorism has also induced other 
responses that limit the country’s participation in the global economy. The country has been 
designated by the U.S. State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, leading to the imposition of 
additional sanctions that include a ban on arms-related exports and sales, dual-use items, and a 
prohibition of receiving economic assistance.38 
The sanction regime and other isolating economic policies have led to destabilizing effects to 
the global economy and overall international security. Iran is a major oil producer internationally, 
and is located along the Strait of Hormuz, which is critical in the supply chain of oil from the 
Persian Gulf to the global oil market.39 Iran has threatened to seal off the strait from international 
                                                
35 Atlantic Council, “Iran’s Growing Cyber Capabilities in a Post-Stuxnet Era,” April 10, 2015, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/iran-s-growing-cyber-capabilities-in-a-post-stuxnet-era. 
36 Ataev, “Economic Sanctions and Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Iran.” 
37 “Continuing U.S. Efforts to Discourage Iran's Nuclear Program,” The American Journal of International Law 101, No. 3 
(July 2007): 666-668. 
38 United States Department of State, “Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,” Bureau of Counterterrorism, 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm. 
39 Peter Pham, “Iran's Threat to the Strait of Hormuz: A Realist Assessment,” American Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal 
of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 32, Issue 2 (2010): 64-74. 
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use as a response to military actions from the United States or Israel, which would disable the 
shipments of one-fifth of the world’s daily use of oil.40 This possibility creates a significant threat to 
international security, both in economic terms and through creating the possibility of escalating a 
preventive war. 
As a side effect of the international sanctions and other alienating efforts, Iran has also 
sustained severe human security implications in its domestic environment. The economic 
consequences of sanctions have worsened the state of the already weak economy and hurt the 
general population, whereas the elites have found tools to circumvent the negative implications and 
costs.41 In addition to economic suffering, the population has also experienced the effects of 
alienation from the international community. The freedom to travel internationally, study abroad, 
engage in international trade, and many other activities are more challenging for Iranian citizens.42 
The human rights record of the government also reflects the negative effects of alienation to the 
general population. Iran has been criticized for limiting the freedom of speech, disregarding fair 
trials and the rule of law, and overall repressing its population in a variety of areas. All of these 
effects have been intensified as a result of alienation, as the government has found further ground 
for radical approaches to maintain stability.  
All of these consequences are a reflection of the security dilemma that has emerged as a 
result of Iran’s outcast position in the international community. These strategies and 
counterstrategies have severe destabilizing effects on the international community and pose a threat 
to international security. However, a more significant reason why these dynamics are so threatening 
to global stability stems from the potential risks that the international community has fortunately 
avoided so far, including nuclear war. At times, Israel and the United States were on the cusp of 
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attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, but fortunately the conditions never escalated to kinetic war. The 
Stuxnet cyberattack, however, demonstrates that the Israel-U.S. side had willingness to confront Iran 
and possibly take their offensive further. The end result could have been very different, if the 
conditions and internal deliberations in the countries had been slightly more aggressive.   
Furthermore, the situation is a threat to the international security due to the intangible costs 
related to the missed potential of stability and security to the global community. Iran has a 
significant stake in some of the most pressing international security challenges based on its 
geographical position and regional relations, including the Sunni-Shi’ia sectarian tensions, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Due to its alienated position, Iran has usually 
not been included as a legitimate party in the negotiations, which has disabled the utilization of the 
country’s political resources and interests as a leverage to solve the conflicts. With regard to the 
conflict in Syria, for example, the country was first invited by the United Nations to participate in 
the Geneva-II peace talks in 2014. Pressure from the United States, however, led to the withdrawal 
of the invitation.43 Iran has continued its participation in the conflict through arming Shi’ite militias 
and collaborating with Russia, which further exemplifies how the country is forced to project its 
power through radical strategies. In addition, there are opportunity costs related to the defensive and 
offensive capabilities that countries have deployed as a result of the heightened threat they 
experience from Iran. If the countries adapted their perceptions of each other and developed more 
cordial relations, based on accurate threat considerations, these resources could be used more 
effectively to attain security.  
Solution 
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The international community’s ability to end the diplomacy of alienation depends, first and 
foremost, whether or not the targeted state is revisionist or only misperceived as one. The feedback 
loop functions the same way in both situations, so a key first step is determining what the specific 
circumstances are with the state in questions. In essence, this means that the strategies towards 
reintegrating alienated states must be highly individualized and tailored to fit the specific conditions. 
Overall, if the state in question is truly power-seeking and revisionist, then the international 
community can only incentivize it to end its radical foreign policy approaches if the state is given 
means to gain a more powerful position and reach its objectives through more legitimate strategies. 
But given the role that the diplomacy of alienation has in great power competition, this would be 
seen as giving in to the opposing side and allowing it to gain power through its proxy state. Thus, 
the solution to ending the diplomacy of alienation in these conditions requires a shift in the 
relationship between great powers. This is a function of complex dynamics between the states, 
however, and the mechanisms that could be used to precipitate this change are very limited. Thus, 
the solution should be focused on circumstances where there is potential for an interruption in the 
feedback loop that could lead to the reintegration of the alienated state. 
A promising opening for shifting away from alienating diplomacy, however, can emerge 
when there is a disruption in the dynamics of the self-fulfilling feedback loop. First, this can be the 
result of the isolated state escalating its radical approaches, which can lead to a change in the 
relations between the great powers. The escalation of radical strategies can turn the supporter state 
against its proxy and incentivize it to cooperate with the opposing side to restrain the radical state. 
In these conditions, the feedback loop has accelerated to a breaking point, where the destabilizing 
foreign policy strategies of the revisionist small power are also becoming a security threat to the 
supporter state. Now, a consensus can be reached within the international community to take a 
more forceful approach against the revisionist state, leading to measures that can end the 
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destabilizing effects that threaten the collective security of the global community. This scenario 
would seem relatively rare, however, as the smaller revisionist states have learned to strike an 
equilibrium where they can use the great power competition in their benefit and continue using their 
radical approaches as a means of projecting power in the international community. 
Secondly, the disruption in the dynamics of the feedback loop can emerge in the form of a 
changed status of the revisionist state and its motivations. If the state starts to reconsider the 
benefits of pursuing power unilaterally as an alienated state, as opposed to according to international 
norms of behavior, it may conclude that the latter option is preferable in the current conditions of 
the world. Especially as the international community as a whole is becoming more interconnected, 
the benefits of cooperation are increasing and the opportunity costs of being outside the system are 
becoming more burdening. The challenge is, however, that the iterations of the feedback loop 
reinforce the current perceptions that states have of each other. Alienating diplomacy ensures that 
states continue to see each other as opponents and consider the other side as revisionist, even if 
there are reasons to change notions about the states’ motivations and their behavioral compatibility 
with international norms.  
The solution to a scenario where the revisionist state has fundamentally changed its priorities 
must address the different dimensions of the feedback loop. States need to critically consider their 
assumptions about other states’ driving motivations and be receptive to changing their notions, if 
there is a reason to do so. This new approachability will also incentivize the alienated states to start 
respecting international norms and act collaboratively. This will also provide a basis for addressing 
the second challenge, as the changed perceptions will eventually enable the reintegration of the 
alienated states to the international community and grant them access to the full spectrum of foreign 
policy choices that are in accordance with the current international order. As this happens, the 
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countries also gain ability to use their diplomatic resources and interests as a means to deescalate 
some of the most pressing conflicts that threaten international security and stability. 
These aims can be achieved through embarking on an interactive dialogue that enables both 
sides to increase their knowledge of the other side’s intentions and motivations, as well as create 
clarity about the expected responses the counterpart will take. Changing states’ false perceptions 
about each other’s driving motivations requires the feedback loop to decelerate, in order for new 
informational variables to be taken into account. The focus needs to be on the factors that enable 
states to cooperate in the first place – creating iterated interactions, ensuring mutual gains from 
cooperation, emphasizing the opportunity cost of noncooperation, and decreasing the risk of 
deflection.  
Given the multiple sources that feed the security dilemma that results from alienating 
diplomacy, and especially the linkage to great power competition, this requires one of the states to 
take a risk and start convincing the other state of its true intentions. One means of doing this is 
costly signaling, which essentially constitutes a leap of faith from a state to increase its adversary’s 
security and aims to demonstrate the state’s status as a security seeker: “An effective costly signal 
convinces the adversary to revise its information about the state, reducing its estimate that the state 
is greedy, thereby increasing the willingness of an opposing security seeker to cooperate.”44  
International institutions are in an important role in enabling states to take this risk, as they 
can act as a legitimate forum for interaction and provide a mechanism for states to send transparent 
signals about their intentions and motivations. When costly signaling is done through international 
institutions, the associated risks are also lessened. The feedback loop can eventually be halted, 
leading to circumstances where “the security dilemma is eliminated and neither state has incentives 
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to compete, even if material conditions would otherwise fuel insecurity and competition.”45 Thus, 
this very realist problem can be approached through a liberal solution that bases its legitimacy on 
international institutions and cooperation. 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was signed in July 2015 between Iran, the 
five UNSC permanent members, and Germany, is an example of costly signal that can act as a 
precipitating factor for the shift in mutual perceptions.46 The agreement details the steps that the 
country will take to terminate its nuclear proliferation efforts in exchange for the lifting of 
international sanctions. The agreement is built on security concerns and aims to disarm Iran of the 
capability of developing nuclear arms, but it also lessens the risk of a foreign attack in Iran and acts 
as an initial confidence-building measure between the country and the West. The agreement poses 
risks for both sides, however, as Iran is willingly disarming its nuclear weapons capabilities, and the 
West is allowing Iran to access financial resources that could be used to build offenses in the future. 
The nuclear agreement can be employed as an initial platform for ending the confrontational 
consequences of the feedback loop of alienation and finding new areas for cooperation between Iran 
and the West. The JCPA connects the issue of nonproliferation to economic benefits; a similar 
linkage framework could be used next to address other problematic issue areas in Iran’s foreign and 
domestic policies. Promoting human rights, strengthening civil society, and legitimizing the rule of 
law are examples of challenges that Iran could be encouraged to improve on, if these issues were 
linked to incentives such as additional financial benefits or diplomatic recognition. These actions 
would start to change the mutual perceptions that the two sides have of each other, and start 
granting Iran legitimate foreign policy tools that it currently doesn’t have access to due to its 
economic and political isolation. 
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Obstacles to Solutions 
When the diplomacy of alienation is mainly driven by great power competition and concrete 
reasons to believe that the revisionist power is using its radical approaches to project its power, the 
key obstacle is at the core of these dynamics. As stated, these conditions will only shift when there 
are incentives for the other side of the great power equation to change its stance, which requires a 
change in the relationship between the great powers. If, on the other hand, the diplomacy of 
alienation is maintained through mutual misperceptions, the key obstacles to ending isolation relate 
to factors in domestic politics and individual state leadership of the involved countries. If the 
domestic-level general population, elites, and individual leaders continue perceiving a high threat 
level from the opposing side, they are not open to taking in new informational variables that could 
result in adapted perceptions and shifting foreign policy approaches.  
In the classical realist paradigm, states are seen as unitary actors and essentially as ‘black 
boxes’ that only respond to systemic-level variables. Relaxing this assumption to include factors at 
the domestic and individual levels, however, is necessary for developing a more comprehensive 
understanding of how the obstructive dynamics related to alienation arise in the real world. The 
divergent and conflicting threat perceptions of different constituencies within nations create friction 
that will have an impact on the state’s multinational interactions with other countries. Even if 
systemic level considerations included perfect conditions for states to interact, cooperate, and 
change their misperceptions, the challenges arising from the domestic and individual levels can 
prevent any changes from happening. 
The factors influencing the internal threat perceptions within states include the issue’s 
strategic or emotional priority; the interpretation of the atmosphere of tension and mistrust in the 
state’s relations with other actors; and the observer state’s perception of its vulnerability in the 
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situation.47 Additionally, threatening cues often involve actions or events that “imply the betrayal of 
a trust or the performance of an illegitimate action – the infringement, in some sense, of rules of the 
game governing relations between the actors involved.”48 All of these factors relate to the threat of 
deception and the danger that states don’t behave according to the expected and accepted norms. 
This possibility is a strong disincentive for leaders to take any steps towards enhanced interaction 
and integration, which will consequently prevent changes in their perception of the other state’s 
motivations.  
The dynamics that took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union provide an important 
case study of the successes and failures of engagement and integration policies towards states that 
were previously perceived as opponents. In this context, the NATO integration process can be seen 
as a form of costly signaling. The military alliance took a strong approach towards interacting with 
former Warsaw Pact members in the Eastern block of Europe, which in many cases resulted in their 
full integration both economically and in security terms as NATO members.49 Poland provides one 
example of a former Warsaw Pact member that has successfully become a full member of the 
European community, as it is one of the fastest growing economies in Europe and a strong 
contributor to the NATO alliance. The key for successfully changing mutual perceptions and initiate 
the integration process relates to the historic experiences and internal drive to integrate within the 
target countries: “Attracted by both the prosperity that the European Union promised and the 
security that NATO’s Article 5 common defense commitment delivered, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, the first three new entrants, were keen to anchor themselves in the west. 
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Notably, each of these countries had had a searing experience under Russian domination, creating a 
natural impulse to escape the shadow of their larger, eastern neighbor.”50 
However, the NATO integration efforts have not automatically resulted in mended relations 
and successful integration. The idea of Russia becoming a NATO member floated around in early 
2000’s, with a genuine aim of integrating the country in the security alliance. In the following years, 
however, the relations went to the opposite direction. As a result of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
many states again perceive the country as revisionist and radical. This shows how difficult it is to 
assess state intentions and create expectations about their behavior, and what the risks of a failed 
costly signaling can be. Studying empirical examples of states with diverse historical experiences and 
domestic circumstances is crucial in understanding the role of domestic politics and individual 
leadership in creating effective engagement policies and avoiding miscalculations. 
The obstacles that can prevent Iran from becoming accepted as a full member of the 
international community are also a function of internal politics and individual leaders. The domestic 
political sphere of Iran is divided and turbulent, with internal power struggles and conflicting views 
about the intentions of other countries. There is also severe disagreement in the international 
community, and within individual states, about the logic of approaching Iran as a negotiation partner 
and granting it legitimacy. This was demonstrates in the debate within the United States government, 
where certain politicians took it as their objective to “keep U.S.-Iranian relations trapped in a spiral 
of suspicion, demonization, and counterproductive rivalry.”51 These dynamics create a reinforcing 
effect in the feedback loop and enable continued antagonistic perceptions: “Won’t continuing to 
treat Iran as a pariah reinforce its own hard-liners’ claims that the “Great Satan” is irrevocably 
hostile, and give them every reason to continue the activities that still concern us? At the very least, 
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isn’t assuming the worst about Iran – something the United States has done for decades – just a self-
fulfilling prophecy?”52 
This does not need to be Iran’s position in the world, however. 53 The country’s leadership is 
assessed as rational and security-oriented, as opposed to inherently radical and expansionist: 
“Overall, Iran’s motivations for backing radicals are primarily strategic, though ideology does play a 
role. Unlike Pakistan, domestic politics is not an important driver of Iran’s support for terrorism. 
Ties to terrorists and to militant substate groups in general give Iran several strategic advantages.”54 
If the international community is able to engage with the country in a way that outweighs the 
security advantages that the current foreign policy strategies have, there is tremendous potential for 
cooperation. The challenge will be on deciding how to approach the ideological conflict within the 
country – whether to engage with these components, or prevent them from interfering with the 
rational aspects of the country’s policymaking community. 
There are several hopeful signs that this process is possible to initiate and implement. Even 
though there were clear reasons for the international community to perceive Iran as revisionist at the 
time of the revolution, and following the country’s radical foreign policy approaches, there are now 
several signals that indicate a reason to change these assumptions. First, the fact that several 
countries, including Russia and China, have continuously perceived Iran as a rational state and 
developed important security and economic alliances with it, which demonstrates that Iran is indeed 
motivated by security priorities. Second, the recent success of the nuclear agreement shows Iran’s 
willingness to reengage with the West and accept the norms of the current international order, which 
also creates a rationale for states to diminish their threat perceptions of the country. Several states, 
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including many in Europe, have already started to shift their assessment of Iran’s motivations and 
engage with the country economically and diplomatically. In the months following the JCPA, Iran 
has already welcomed trade delegations from France, the United Kingdom, Italy, India, and multiple 
other states.55 The country was also granted a legitimate role in the relaunched Syrian peace 
negotiations, which is a sign that the United States and Saudi Arabia might also be changing their 
views about the strategic implications of engaging with Iran.56 
In addition to these current signs of the shifting mutual perceptions, the past also provides a 
powerful indication that Iran is capable of extensive collaboration with the international community, 
including the Unites States. During the Cold War and prior to the Islamic revolution, the United 
States maintained very cordial relations with the Shah-ruled Iran.57 This is a strong indication that 
there are no systemic-level reasons that would make the states incompatible for collaboration. If 
both sides see enough utility for the partnership and consider their interests to be aligned, 
cooperation can be established and both sides can be experience a threat of deflection that is 
sufficiently low. 
Iran’s inclusion as a full member of the international community creates considerable 
potential for enhanced international security conditions and increased stability particularly in South 
Asia and the greater Middle East. One of the issue areas where Iran’s inclusion could make 
significant contributions towards improved international security is the situation in Afghanistan, 
where there all regional players have critical convergent interests in countering drug trafficking, 
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developing infrastructure, and managing water issues.58 Iran has already played an important role in 
the country, as it was a key contributor in the process that led to the establishment of the new 
Afghan government after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, before U.S.-Iran relations 
froze as a result of President Bush associated the country as a part of  ‘the axis of evil’.59 During this 
period, Iran used its influence on the behalf of the United States in its relations with the Northern 
Alliance and other parts of the Afghan opposition.60 Iran has a legitimate interest reestablishing its 
role in this issue area and improving the condition of the fragile country. Solving the situation in 
Afghanistan has been an enormous challenge to the international community and resulted in 
continued regional instability, and bringing Iran and its resources back into the equation could result 
in greatly improved security and stability in in South Asia.  
The conflict in Syria is another area where the changed perceptions of Iran could lead to 
significant implications to international security and stability. In its current position, Iran projects its 
power through funding Shi’ite militias and supporting the Assad government with Russia. Western 
and Iranian interests in the conflict are strongly aligned in many ways, however, and enhanced 
relations could enable genuine military and diplomatic cooperation in these areas.61 This could 
increase the possibility of a sustainable solution to the conflict that has already killed over 250,000 
Syrians, and greatly improve the stability of the greater Middle East. Solving the Syrian conflict 
through Iranian help could also create synergies in other unstable hostilities in the region, including 
Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the latter, Iran and Syria have been key countries 
obstructing the peace between Arabs and Israelis, as the states see it to be incompatible with their 
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own regional and strategic interests.62 Changed Iranian relations with the West would change the 
state’s cost-benefit analysis, however, and incentivize it to shift its views of the best solution to the 
conflict. 
The international community’s next steps need to focus on capitalizing the value that the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action brings as a form of costly signaling, and turning the agreement 
from a security guarantee into a vehicle of interaction and integration. Enhanced trade relations and 
the inclusion of Iran in diplomatic negotiations can be used as further confidence-building measures 
to enable shifts in the perceptions of the states’ domestic constituencies and leadership. The 
challenge is that the improving relations may first create an intensification in hostile perceptions and 
actions in certain factions within the countries, if the changing status quo results in lost financial or 
political benefits. Following the JCPA, there have been accelerating Iranian cyberattack activity 
against the United States, and increasingly hostile political rhetoric within certain American interest 
groups.63 The best option for all sides is to patiently restrain from overreactions and escalation, and 
wait for the domestic politics within states to regain balance and reach a new stable state that accepts 
the changed relations. 
Conclusion 
Diplomacy of alienation is a threat to the security and stability of the international 
community, but it is also a policy that is difficult to reverse. At its core, it is driven by systemic-level 
great power competition, but it can also be maintained as a residual of these dynamics in the form of 
misperceptions that states have of each other’s motivations. Both of these scenarios lead to a 
condition that constitutes a self-feeding security dilemma, creating layers of antagonistic history and 
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hostile relations, which will always stay at the back of the minds of domestic constituencies and 
national leaders. As the case of Iran demonstrates, however, the international community can engage 
with the alienated countries incrementally and start building confidence through measures such as 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. A tremendous amount of analysis, understanding, and 
strategic thinking is required for states to reestablish confidence and start changing their perceptions 
of other states’ motivations. As a statement from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei demonstrates, however, 
these efforts will not be futile and will be reciprocated in the correct conditions: “Show us if really 
anything other than your language has changed. -- Should you change, our behavior will change too. 
-- My expectation is, in the coming months, we will be looking for openings that can be created 
where we can start sitting across the table, face to face, diplomatic overtures that will allow us to 
move our policy in a new direction.”64 This prospect should reenergize the international community 
to pursue rapprochement and mend relations with states that are lost in the confinement of 
alienating diplomacy that are based on misperceptions. 
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